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Abstract 
This paper reflects on the ongoing challenges presented by certain 
employers who, whilst deducting occupational retirement fund 
contributions from their employees' salaries, fail to pay over those 
contributions to the relevant occupational retirement funds. These 
employers also often fail to register themselves or their employees as 
participating members of occupational retirement funds when they are 
supposed to. Such failures to register with the relevant occupational 
retirement funds and to pay over fund contributions have disastrous 
effects on the employees who are at the receiving end of these unlawful 
practices. This is the case because employees lose the value and use of 
their salaries through the deductions, and also the benefits of their 
occupational retirement funds. 
Although the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 is sufficiently responsive and 
provides adequate mechanisms to guide against this scourge, it is this 
paper's argument that occupational retirement funds themselves have not 
done their bit in enforcing the Pension Funds Act. The failure on the part 
of the funds to enforce the Pension Funds Act by ensuring that fund 
contributions are collected from participating employers has resulted in, 
and continues to result in, untold losses on the part of the employees. 
Properly considered, the paper submits that the failure by occupational 
retirement funds to enforce the Pension Funds Act has the potential of 
unjustifiably limiting several of the employee members' constitutional 
rights. 
It is not good enough, so argues the paper, for occupational retirement 
funds to have rules that prohibit them from paying retirement fund 
benefits where no contributions have been received. It is also not good 
enough for courts and the office of the PFA to blindly enforce the rules of 
occupational retirement funds without consistently subjecting them to the 
Pension Funds Act and the Constitution for validity and legality. It is on 
this basis that the case of Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund (SA) v 
Pension Funds Adjudicator is challenged. The case is authority for the 
principle that the only available remedy to an employee who has been 
cheated out of retirement fund benefits owing to the employer's failure to 
make fund contributions is one that compels the fund to calculate those 
outstanding contributions and demand that total sum from the employer. 
For various reasons this does not address the problem of defaulting 
employers, which can be addressed only by properly enforcing the 
Pension Funds Act and also consistently subjecting the rules to the Act in 
cases of disputes. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between the Pension Funds Act1 and the rules of an 
occupational retirement fund is one that needs some attention. This is 
particularly important in the light of the steady stream of determinations 
coming from the office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator2 (hereafter the 
office of the PFA) relating on the one hand to failures of certain employers 
to pay fund contributions to the relevant occupational retirement funds and 
on the other to failures by certain employers to register themselves as well 
as to register certain or all of their employees as participants and 
employee members of those occupational retirement funds when they are 
supposed to.3 In both instances, employers would be deducting monies 
from their employees and failing to pay those monies to the relevant 
occupational retirement funds as employee contributions. 
Judging from the rising number of such determinations it is clear that the 
problem of defaulting and non-complying employers is rife in the 
retirement benefits industry and the individual occupational retirement 
funds appear to be doing little to address the problem. The problem is 
often discovered by the employees themselves who when claiming 
withdrawal benefits from their occupational retirement funds following a 
dismissal, a resignation, or a retrenchment discover that the fund is not in 
a position to pay the withdrawal benefits claim. In some cases the fund is 
found to be in a position to pay but can pay only a portion of the 
withdrawal benefits claim because the employer had made only partial 
contributions to the fund. This prompts employee members to complain to 
the office of the PFA.  
In such cases the office of the PFA appears to have been principled and 
consistent in its approach that an appropriate relief in those circumstances 
is one which has the effect of placing the employee member in the position 
                                            
* Thulani Nkosi. BA, LLB (Wits), LLM (UJ). Associate Lecturer and Practising 
Attorney, Wits Law Clinic, University of the Witwatersrand. E-mail: 
Thulani.Nkosi@wits.ac.za. I would like to thank my colleague Professor Philippa 
Kruger for support and Wits Law Clinic candidate attorneys, Natalie Chesi, David 
Blainey, Gugulethu Chauke and Nokulunga Mthembu for reading previous versions 
of this paper. I am also grateful for the comments received from the anonymous 
reviewers of the journal. All views and shortcomings are my own. 
1  Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (the Pension Funds Act). 
2  The Office of the Pension Funds Adjudicator is established in terms of s 30B of the 
Act. S 30D empowers the PFA to investigate and decide complaints lodged in terms 
of the Act in a procedurally fair, economical and expeditious manner.  
3  See Malatji v Gauteng Building Provident Fund PFA/NP/9447/2011/LMP, which is 
one of the latest determinations coming from the PFA, where an employer had not 
registered its employee as a member in a provident fund despite the sectoral 
determination obliging the employer to register the employee. 
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he would have been had the employer paid all contributions to the fund.4 
That appropriate relief often involves the office of the PFA ordering the 
fund to calculate and prepare schedules of all outstanding contributions 
and then submit those to the employer, who is ordered to pay over to the 
fund those outstanding contributions. Once the fund receives the 
outstanding contributions it is then placed in the position where it is able to 
meet the employee's withdrawal benefits claim. In carving out such an 
appropriate relief the office of the PFA always cites the High Court case of 
Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator 5 
as authority for the orders it makes. It is for this reason that the case calls 
for comment and reconsideration. 
Orion Money Purchase has a vexed history in that it began as a complaint 
to the office of the PFA by certain employees who, following their 
dismissals, could not be paid their withdrawal benefits because the fund 
was not in a position to do so owing to the employer having failed to make 
contributions to the fund. The then pension funds adjudicator, Professor 
John Murphy, determined the dispute in favour of the employees and 
thereafter ordered the fund to pay withdrawal benefits to the employees 
despite the fund's protestations that it was not empowered by its rules to 
pay benefits where no contributions had been received from the employer.  
Feeling aggrieved by the adjudicator's determination, the fund approached 
the High Court, where Murphy's determination was overturned, and so 
began the process that led to the current state of affairs where in matters 
pertaining to defaulting employers the fund is ordered to calculate 
outstanding contributions and submit the calculations to defaulting 
employers, who are then expected to pay over the accumulated 
outstanding contributions to the fund. 
Orion Money Purchase on the face of it appears to be logically sound in 
that it calls for an employee member of the fund to be placed in a position 
he would have been had contributions been received by the fund, but on 
close inspection the case is highly problematic. The case has the potential 
of bringing untold hardships to employee members whose contributions 
were not paid over to the relevant funds. This is so because the entire 
reasoning behind the case is premised on the assumption that employers 
                                            
4  The office of the PFA's order often reads "The appropriate relief is that which has the 
effect of placing the complainant in the position he would have been had the 
employer paid the contributions to the [fund]". See amongst other determinations 
Khanye v The Private Sector Security Provident Fund PFA/GP/00003523/2013/MR 
para 5.8. 
5  Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund (SA) v Pension Funds Adjudicator 2002 JOL 
10037 (C) (hereafter Orion Money Purchase). 
TG NKOSI  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  3 
will always be in a position to pay over outstanding fund contributions once 
they have been determined by the fund. The case does not envision a 
realistic situation where, owing to a variety of factors ranging from how 
much the fund has determined to be outstanding and owing by a particular 
employer, to that employer's financial position at the time the fund submits 
its calculations, that particular employer is simply not in a position to meet 
the fund's calculations. Put differently, Orion Money Purchase does not 
account for the fact that in certain instances employers will not be in a 
position to pay over the accumulated fund contributions. In those 
situations, what relief and remedies are available to employee members 
who for reasons not of their making are deprived of their withdrawal 
benefits? 
Another problematic aspect of Orion Money Purchase is that it allows 
occupational retirement funds to manipulate and hide behind fund rules 
and in the process deprive employee members of their fund benefits. The 
manipulation of fund rules is not a novel occurrence, however, and this is 
what makes the judgment particularly disappointing, as the High Court 
ought to have guarded against such manipulation. Poorman and Andrews 
capture and decry the manipulation of fund rules in the following terms:  
Almost from its infancy … the pension fund industry demonstrated the ease 
with which fund rules could be manipulated to the advantage of the fund 
whose interests were often closely allied with the employer. Thus, the 
Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 was designed to protect and secure worker's 
investments …6 
This paper aims to offer a critique of Orion Money Purchase for its glaring 
failure to sufficiently respond to the problem of defaulting employers. This 
paper will also argue that though binding on the retirement funds industry, 
Orion Money Purchase when properly considered is far from convincing, 
and it is unfortunate that so much jurisprudence has grown and continues 
to grow under it. It will be argued that properly considered Orion Money 
Purchase was decided on an incorrect interpretation of the Pension Funds 
Act, and the High Court failed to meaningfully engage with the legally 
sound and convincing views of the then Pension Funds Adjudicator 
Professor John Murphy. 
In advancing a critique of Orion Money Purchase this paper will firstly 
consider the position of the rules of an occupational retirement fund 
against the Pension Funds Act, keeping in mind that current popular belief 
in the retirement benefits industry is to the effect that in matters 
concerning retirement funds the rules of the fund must be resorted to first 
                                            
6  Poorman and Andrews 1991 ILJ 984. 
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because they bind the fund and its members and are therefore supreme. 
This view of the supremacy of the rules is often expressed in the following 
terms: 
... the rules constitute a contract between [the fund] and its members and 
that, once such rules are approved by the Registrar, the relationship 
between the [fund] and its members is governed solely by the rules ...7 
The supremacy of the rules idea is intended to convey a message that an 
occupational retirement fund may do only that which is provided for in its 
rules. Conversely, so the argument goes, if it is not provided for in the 
rules then the fund cannot do it. In other words, if the rules, as was the 
case in Orion Money Purchase, do not provide for the payment of benefits 
where no contributions had been received from the employer, then the 
fund is not liable to pay any benefits at all. This is, of course, cold comfort 
to the affected employee.  
The supreme status of the rules is expressed in the following manner: 
By virtue of the binding nature of the rules, the trustees of the first 
respondent, the members, the participating employer and any service 
provider such as the administrator of the fund may only do what is set forth 
in the rules.8 
Conceiving of the rules of the fund as supreme has led to a situation 
where every dispute that has to do with an occupational retirement fund is 
determined only with reference to the rules of that fund, and the Pension 
Funds Act is hardly mentioned in that process. This approach to retirement 
fund disputes, though problematic, is firmly entrenched. In one of its 
determinations the office of the PFA correctly captured this entrenched 
position as thus:  
The rights, duties and the benefit entitlement of the members of a pension 
fund will always be confined to that which is prescribed in its registered rules. 
Put differently, the rules determine the right of a member's benefit 
entitlement regardless of the action or attitude of a functionary such as the 
participating employer, the board of trustees or the administrator …9 
This approach to the resolution of fund disputes, as entrenched as it is, is 
highly problematic because it neglects one very important proviso, namely 
                                            
7  The Council for Medical Schemes v Genesis Medical Scheme 2016 1 SA 429 (SCA) 
para 35. 
8  See amongst others Van der Burgh v Eskom Pension and Provident Fund 
PFA/GA/7389/06/VIA para 5.2.1; Erasmus v Corporate Selection Retirement Fund 
PFA/NW/6968/06/VIA para 5.1; Mnguni v Abbot Laboratories SA (Pty) Ltd Pension 
Fund PFA/GA/5827/05/VIA para 5.1. 
9  Van der Burgh v Eskom Pension and Provident Fund PFA/GA/7389/06/VIA para 
5.2.1. 
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that the rules of an occupational retirement fund are in fact subject to the 
provisions of the Pension Funds Act. To be subject to the provisions of the 
Pension Funds Act means that no rule of an occupational retirement fund 
may directly or indirectly conflict with any provision of the Pension Funds 
Act.10 
The lawfulness of refusing to pay withdrawal benefits on the basis that the 
rules do not provide for such payment where no contributions had been 
received is doubtful. It is therefore not surprising that the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in a slightly different context but on the subject of rules has 
recently held that there is no reason to accept that an obligation imposed 
by a statute like the Pension Funds Act on occupational retirement funds 
to pay withdrawal benefits becomes unenforceable just because its 
registered rules do not make provision for such payments.11  
The current approach to resolving occupational retirement funds disputes 
and the case of Orion Money Purchase will be criticised on at least three 
fronts. One: it will be argued that the current approach is incorrect 
because it fails to envision and properly deal with a situation where, 
notwithstanding an order for the payment of outstanding contributions, a 
particular employer is simply not in a position to meet the order. On this 
argument the paper will argue that a better approach is one that avoids 
this possibility at all costs by placing the liability to pay withdrawal benefits 
on the fund regardless of whether or not fund contributions had been 
received by the fund. This better approach can be achieved by simply 
applying the Pension Funds Act, where the application of the rules will 
lead to inequitable outcomes.  
Two: it will be argued further that the current approach goes against what 
the Pension Funds Act envisioned a fund would be required to do in 
instances where a particular employer is not complying with its duties, 
including the duty to make fund contributions. In advancing this argument 
it will be argued that the Pension Funds Act obliges the fund to be 
proactive and take steps to collect contributions from all employers, 
especially those who are defaulting. In fact section 13(10) of the Act 
specifically obliges an occupational retirement fund to report any 
defaulting and non-complying employer to the registrar of pension funds. 
Where occupational retirement funds fail to take those proactive steps 
                                            
10  See Sentra-Oes Kooperatief Bpk v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1995 3 SA 
197 (A) 207B-G. 
11  The Council for Medical Schemes v Genesis Medical Scheme 2016 1 SA 429 (SCA) 
para 36. This case dealt with the rules of a medical aid scheme in the light of the 
Medical Schemes Act 131 of 1998. 
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within the framework of the legislation, determinations and orders, this 
paper will argue, should be made against those funds, even if the rules do 
not provide for the fund to pay withdrawal benefits in situations where no 
contributions had been received. 
Three: this paper will argue that the law espoused in Orion Money 
Purchase is in the light of the Financial Services Laws General 
Amendment Act12 no longer good law, and that the office of the PFA 
should recognise this and stop relying on Orion Money Purchase when 
carving out an appropriate relief in instances where employers have 
defaulted in making fund contributions. In the light of the General 
Amendment Act, an appropriate relief where fund contributions had not 
been received is one that orders personal liability on the person of the 
director or person entrusted with the overall financial affairs of the 
employer.13 This is indicative of the legislative intent to place a positive 
duty on occupational retirement funds to collect fund contributions from 
employers instead of passively waiting for employers to pay over fund 
contributions to the relevant funds. 
2 The binding nature of the rules of an occupational 
retirement fund 
There can be no doubt that the proper regulation and administration of 
occupational retirement funds calls for both the Pension Funds Act and the 
rules to coexist. In this co-existence it is clear that the intention of the 
Pension Funds Act has always been to subject the rules of occupational 
retirement funds to the provisions of the Pension Funds Act. This intention 
is manifest throughout the Pension Funds Act and certain sections of the 
Pension Funds Act could not be any clearer.14 It would follow therefore 
that even in the face of a dispute about the payment of withdrawal benefits 
the appropriate place to start in seeking remedies and the resolution of 
that dispute is the Pension Funds Act and not the rules, as is the current 
practice and approach. The rules must be consistently subjected to the 
provisions of the Pension Funds Act.  
Occupational retirement funds disputes cannot be decided only on the 
basis of what the rules provide for or do not provide for. Invoking the rules 
                                            
12  Financial Services Laws General Amendment Act 45 of 2013 (hereafter General 
Amendment Act). 
13  Section 13A(8) of Pension Funds Act as amended by General Amendment Act.  
14  See for example s 13A(6) of the Act, which obliges the principal officer of the fund or 
any authorised person to monitor and ensure compliance with s 13A, which section 
broadly regulates the payment of fund contributions. 
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without regard to the Pension Funds Act will, as is currently the case, 
always give rise to inequitable outcomes where employee members of 
occupational retirement funds are deprived of their benefits under the 
fund. Numerous cases, including the often cited case of the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in Tek Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz,15 highlight 
the frequency within which courts and the office of the PFA resort to the 
application of the rules in resolving occupational retirement funds disputes. 
In Tek Corporation the Supreme Court of Appeal held that: 
A pension fund, the powers and duties of its trustees and the rights and 
obligations of its members and the employer, are governed by the rules of 
the fund, the relevant legislation and the common law.16 
It is not entirely clear why the Supreme Court of Appeal mentioned the 
rules first, legislation second and the common law last, but in so doing it 
gave credence to the dominant status of the rules. It would have been 
more appropriate for the Supreme Court of Appeal to mention the Pension 
Funds Act first as that would have turned attention to the proper approach 
to be followed when resolving retirement funds disputes, which is that the 
rules must always be subjected to the provisions of the Pension Funds 
Act.  
Perhaps the explanation for giving credence to the rules over the Pension 
Funds Act, as erroneous as it is, has to do with the way in which courts 
have understood the binding nature of the rules. It is beyond doubt that the 
rules of an occupational retirement fund have some binding influence on 
the parties to that occupational retirement fund, but what has not been 
made clear is the reason why the rules are binding in the first place. 
A consideration of this question shows that our courts and the office of the 
PFA have not always been consistent in their approach as to the reason 
why the rules are binding in the first place. At times the rules of an 
occupational retirement fund have been considered to be binding because 
they constituted a contract between the fund and its members.17 However, 
at other times the rules were said to be binding because they constituted a 
                                            
15  Tek Corporation Provident Fund v Lorentz 1999 4 SA 884 (SCA) (hereafter Tek 
Corporation). 
16  Tek Corporation para 15. Also see Mostert v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co (SA) Ltd 
2001 4 SA 159 (SCA) para 30. Also see Gerson v Mondi Pension Fund 2013 6 SA 
162 (GSJ) para 9. 
17  Abrahamse v Connock's Pension Fund 1963 2 SA 76 (WLD) 78D. Also see ABSA 
Bank Ltd v South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union National 
Provident Fund 2012 1 All SA 121 (SCA) para 26. 
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contract between the members, the fund and the employer,18 and at yet 
other times the rules have been held to be binding because they are "more 
akin to domestic subordinate legislation imposed often unilaterally …"19  
The merits or demerits of each of these arguments is currently beyond the 
scope of this paper, but what is clear is that courts and the office of the 
PFA have always held the rules in high regard, although the basis for 
doing so is yet to be determined and explained. It should be noted, 
however, that the generally acceptable view seems to be that the rules are 
binding because they constitute a contract between the occupational 
retirement fund and the parties thereto.20 If this is indeed the case then a 
further question arises as to the type of that contract, keeping in mind that 
often employees are not part of the discussions that inform occupational 
retirement funds and give rise to the rules. 
3 The establishment and regulation of occupational 
retirement funds 
It should never be forgotten that the primary purpose for the existence of 
occupational retirement funds is to provide retirement benefits to their 
employee members when they retire. In this context the importance of 
putting measures in place for the proper regulation of occupational 
retirement funding cannot be gainsaid. This is so even in a country like 
South Africa, where there is no mandatory duty on employers to provide 
their employees with occupational retirement funding, whether in the form 
of a pension fund or a provident fund.21 However, the legal position is that 
should an employer elect to set up retirement funding for its employees, 
then that employer must follow the process set out in the Pension Funds 
Act as well as in the Income Tax Act22 (hereafter ITA) with regards to the 
creation, regulation and administration of that occupational retirement 
fund, keeping in mind the purpose for which occupational retirement funds 
exist.23  
                                            
18  Ekurhuleni Municipality v Germiston Municipal Retirement Fund 2010 2 SA 598 
(SCA) para 12; Chairman of the Board of the Sanlam Pensioenfonds v Registrar of 
Pension Funds 2007 3 SA 41 (T) para 34. 
19  Hospitality Industry Provident Fund v Southern Sun Hotel Interest (Pty) Ltd 2000 8 
BPLR 889 (PFA) para 50. 
20  For one of the latest pronouncements on this see City of Johannesburg v South 
African Local Authorities Pension Fund 2015 ZASCA 4 (9 March 2015) para 4. 
21  Mabale v Feedmix Provident Fund 2008 1 BPLR 29 (PFA) para 6.  
22  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the ITA). 
23  It should be noted that in some cases industry-specific sectoral determinations or 
collective agreements compel employers to participate in occupational retirement 
funding models. 
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The Pension Funds Act must be read together with the ITA. This is the 
case because the ITA also has important provisions that apply to 
occupational retirement funds.24 It is important for all occupational 
retirement funds to comply with the provisions of the ITA so as to be able 
to benefit from the concessions available under the ITA.25 One of those 
important provisions made by the ITA is that an employee's membership 
of the fund throughout the period of employment shall be a condition of 
employment by the employer of all persons of the class or classes 
specified therein who enter employment with that employer on or after the 
date upon which the fund comes into operation.26 From this provision it is 
already apparent that once an employer sets up an occupational 
retirement fund, then that employer is obliged to make membership of that 
fund a condition of employment for all employees. 
The regulation of occupational retirement funds under the Pension Funds 
Act is not difficult. In the first instance, section 4 of the Act provides for a 
compulsory registration process of all occupational retirement funds 
through the office of the Registrar of Pension Funds. The process 
envisaged under section 4 is that a private occupational retirement fund 
will approach the Registrar with its rules, which rules must substantively 
comply with regulation 30, and apply for registration. This is so because 
section 11(1) empowers the fund to adopt rules, which rules must be in the 
prescribed format and must comply with the prescribed requirements set 
out in regulation 30. 
Once registered, according to section 5(1)(a), a fund shall in so far as its 
activities go become a body corporate capable of suing and being sued in 
its own corporate name, and also from that point onwards a fund is 
allowed to do all things necessary for or incidental to the exercise of its 
powers or the performance of its functions in terms of its rules. This 
section read together with section 4B(1) certainly confers juristic 
personality on a retirement fund. 
Section 13 then proceeds to make the rules binding on the fund and its 
members, its shareholders and its officers, as well as any person who 
claims under the rules or whose claim is derived from a person so 
claiming. What is noteworthy is that the rules according to section 13 bind 
everybody who may have something to do with the fund, except the 
                                            
24  Section 1 contains requirements under which pension and provident funds would be 
approved by the Commissioner in any given year of assessment.  
25  Some tax concessions afforded by the ITA relate to the exemptions from income tax 
of the receipts and accruals of the fund under s 10(1)(d). 
26  Section 1(ii)(bb) of the ITA. 
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employer. It is not entirely clear why the employer was left out of the ambit 
of section 13; however, it could be argued that the employer is 
nonetheless bound tacitly or by implication by virtue of having established 
the fund and indirectly by section 13A, which enjoins the employer to pay 
contributions over to the fund. Section 13 also makes it clear that the rules 
derive their binding status from the Pension Funds Act. It then follows that, 
and this is expressly stated in the Pension Funds Act, the rules are subject 
to the Pension Funds Act. This fortifies the argument raised in this paper 
that the rules must be consistently tested for compliance with the Pension 
Funds Act and this can be achieved only if they are applied subject to the 
Act. With this in mind we now return to the case of Orion Money Purchase. 
4  Orion Money Purchase  
4.1 The facts 
It should be stated beforehand that the matter began as two separate 
complaints by two employees of the same employer to the office of the 
PFA. They had been retrenched in 1998. To that end the PFA issued two 
separate determinations, one relating to Ms Sekele (the Sekele 
determination), and the other to Mr Gafane (the Gafane determination). At 
the High Court, for the purposes of the appeal, both determinations were 
consolidated and decided as one. For the sake of completeness each 
determination will be individually discussed, and this discussion will be 
followed by a discussion of the High Court case itself. 
The salient facts of the case were that two employees, Ms Sekele and Mr 
Gafane, both worked for Bahwaduba Bus Services (Pty) Ltd (the 
employer). The employer was a participating member of the Orion Money 
Purchase Pension Fund (the fund), an umbrella fund consisting of various 
participating employer funds. Both Ms Sekele and Mr Gafane had at some 
point, at different times, whilst so employed lost their jobs with the 
employer, but later returned and resumed their employment. Ms Sekele in 
particular lost her job in 1984 and was reemployed from 1990 until 1998, 
when she was retrenched. However, the employer did not register Ms 
Sekele with the fund when she was reemployed, nor did the employer 
make any contributions to the fund on her behalf. This meant that in 1998, 
when Ms Sekele was retrenched, there was no pension benefit available 
to her, because she was not a registered member of the fund. 
The same was the case with Mr Gafane, who initially lost his job and was 
re-employed after concluding a settlement agreement with the employer. 
The settlement agreement provided that Gafane was to be re-employed 
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on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to his dismissal. Prior 
to his dismissal Mr Gafane was registered with the fund and contributions 
were made on his behalf, which contributions were discontinued when he 
was dismissed. The employer did not re-register Mr Gafane with the fund 
when it re-employed him; nor did it make contributions anew on his behalf. 
More, it should be added that Ms Sekele did not receive any benefits when 
she lost her job the first time because even then she was not registered as 
a member of the fund, and Mr Gafane did not receive any benefits when 
he lost his job the first time because there was a rule that prohibited the 
fund from paying any withdrawal benefit where the member had been 
dismissed. The failure to reregister these employees when they returned 
to work for this employer meant that both employees had no withdrawal 
benefits to claim against the fund at the time of their retrenchments in 
1998. Upon discovering this, through their union they lodged complaints 
with the office of the PFA. 
5  Proceedings before the Pension Funds Adjudicator: 
The views of Professor John Murphy 
5.1 Sekele v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund27  
In this matter Murphy initially made a preliminary determination wherein a 
rule nisi was issued calling upon the fund to show cause why a final 
determination should not be made ordering it to pay withdrawal benefits to 
Ms Sekele notwithstanding the fact that she was not a registered member 
of the fund. In addition the fund was ordered to compute all withdrawal 
benefits that would have been due and payable to Ms Sekele on her exit 
from her employ. 
The rule nisi further called upon the employer to show cause why a final 
determination should not be made compelling it to pay over to the fund 
what the fund would have paid to Ms Sekele had it registered her. In 
responding to the rule nisi the fund computed the withdrawal benefit due to 
Ms Sekele and provided three reasons why a final determination should 
not be made against it. One: the fund submitted that Ms Sekele was not its 
registered member. Two: owing to the fact that she was not a member, the 
value of her withdrawal benefit was nil. And three: Sekele had not 
specifically sought any relief against the fund in her complaint.  
                                            
27  Sekele v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund 2001 4 BPLR 1906 (PFA) 
(hereinafter the Sekele determination). 
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In dealing with these submissions from the fund Murphy properly applied 
the rules subject to the Pension Funds Act. In so doing, he noted that in so 
far as membership of and participation to the fund was concerned, the 
rules distinguished between two classes of persons, namely the optional 
class and the compulsory class.28 This was in terms of rules 2.1 and 2.2. 
The differentiation was between those whose membership was optional 
and those whose membership of the fund was mandatory. Upon the 
interpretation of these rules in the light of the Pension Funds Act, Ms 
Sekele was found to belong to the compulsory class and as such qualified 
as a member of the fund with effect from the date of her re-employment.29 
In addressing the issue of the withdrawal benefit which was said to be nil, 
Murphy also subjected the rules to the prism of the Pension Funds Act and 
held that the fund's liability to pay the withdrawal benefit to Ms Sekele was 
provided for in the rules, which also enjoined the employer to make the 
necessary contributions within 7 days of the end of each month.30 This 
was in terms of rule A 8.5.1 read with rule 3 of the master rules. Further, 
Murphy reasoned that the failure by the employer to pay contributions or 
the failure of the fund to collect contributions did not extinguish nor did it 
alter the fund's liability to pay the withdrawal benefits when it was due and 
payable.31  
Going further, Murphy acknowledged that Ms Sekele had sought only an 
order compelling the employer to make the necessary contributions to the 
fund and no relief was sought from the fund. But, so reasoned Murphy, 
sections 30E, 30F, 30H, 30J and 30M of the Pension Funds Act gave him 
powers to investigate and decide on matters of maladministration and 
unlawfulness even if such matters were not raised by the parties. In the 
circumstances, the fund was directed to pay to Ms Sekele her withdrawal 
benefits as if they had been collected from the employer, and the 
employer was ordered to pay over to the fund the total sum of outstanding 
contributions it should have paid to the fund during Ms Sekele's employ. 
5.2 Gafane v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund (SA)32  
The Gafane determination is in material respects similar to the Sekele 
determination in that the issues under consideration were similar and 
similar outcomes were reached by Murphy. Professor Murphy does, 
                                            
28  Sekele determination para 6. 
29  Sekele determination para 19. 
30  Sekele determination para 21. 
31  Sekele determination para 21. 
32  Gafane v Orion Money Purchase Pension Fund (SA) 2001 6 BPLR 2074 (PFA) 
(hereinafter the Gafane determination). 
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however, appear to have been sterner in this determination than he was in 
the Sekele determination. In ordering the fund to pay the withdrawal 
benefit despite there being no contributions received on behalf of Gafane, 
Murphy held that: 
Suffice it to say that the failure by the employer to pay these contributions or 
alternatively the failure by the fund to collect the contributions does not alter 
the fund's liability in respect of the withdrawal benefit. … The fund may very 
well have a claim for damages against the employer, but such a claim does 
not discharge its liability to the complainant. Therefore, I am satisfied that the 
fund is liable to pay the complainant his withdrawal benefit, even though the 
employer failed to actually pay the contributions due.33 
It may have been this very stern reasoning that caused the fund to 
approach the High Court as it did. It is submitted that what is most 
important about the Gafane determination in particular is that Murphy 
appears to have realised that in truth the liability of the fund to pay 
withdrawal benefits to its members does not stem from the rules but from 
the Pension Funds Act itself. The rules only facilitate the fund's liability by 
regulating the internal affairs between the fund and its members, including 
both employer and employee members. If the liability of the fund to its 
members emanated solely from the rules, then the Pension Funds Act 
would become nugatory and funds would easily manipulate the rules to 
the disadvantage of employee members. Put in another way, it may very 
well be that the rules determine entitlement to a pension or provident 
benefit but the Pension Funds Act determines and fixes the fund's liability 
to employee members. Accordingly, just as "a regulation cannot determine 
the interpretation of a statutory provision",34 so can the rules of an 
occupational retirement fund not be used to bypass the fund's statutory 
liability to pay withdrawal benefits. It is this nuanced relationship between 
the rules and the Pension Funds Act that is currently not properly 
understood by the courts, the office of the PFA, and industry players. 
6 Proceedings before the High Court: the judgment of 
Nel J 
The High Court consolidated the two determinations as they raise the 
same question, namely whether the fund was liable to pay withdrawal 
benefits where none had been received from the employer. The fund 
                                            
33  Gafane determination para 21. 
34  Chief Registrar of Deeds v Hamilton-Brown 1969 2 SA 543 (AD) 547H. 
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submitted before Nel J on the strength of Tek Corporation35 that its rules 
did not  
… permit [it] to deem contributions to have been paid and then to pay out 
withdrawal benefits on the basis of such notional contributions as the 
withdrawal benefits were confined to the amounts that had accrued in 
respect of contributions which had actually been made.36  
Nel J accepted the submissions made by the fund and without engaging 
with the opinions and the reasoning of Professor Murphy found in favour of 
the fund and set aside Murphy's determinations. In setting aside Murphy's 
determinations Nel J held: 
As pointed out by Mr. Farlam the Fund may only act within the powers 
conferred upon it by its Rules, and its Rules do not provide for the payment 
of non-existent benefits. 
… 
It follows that the determination made by the Adjudicator should be set 
aside. The complainants, Sekele and Gafane lost their pension benefits 
because the Bus Services failed to pay pension fund contributions on their 
behalf.37  
From the above it is clear that Nel J effectively held that an obligation to 
pay withdrawal benefits imposed on an occupational fund by the Pension 
Funds Act becomes unenforceable when the rules of that fund provide 
otherwise. 
7 Analysis and discussion of determinations and 
judgment 
From an equity and fairness point of view for the employee member of the 
fund who is the most vulnerable party in this relationship, Murphy's 
determinations, though not binding, were more persuasive than Nel J's 
judgment. Murphy's determinations in the two cases properly considered 
did no more than give effect to the clear provisions of the Pension Funds 
Act, and as such should have been upheld by Nel J. 
In many ways these determinations were a curtain raiser to Emma v Orion 
Money Purchase Provident Fund (SA).38 In this determination, also against 
Orion Money Purchase Fund, the complainants had averred that the fund 
                                            
35  Tek Corporation para 28 held that "what the trustees may do with the fund's assets 
is set forth in the rules. If what they propose to do (or have been ordered to do) is not 
within the powers conferred upon them by the rules, they may not do it". 
36  Orion Money Purchase 16. 
37  Orion Money Purchase 17. 
38  Emma v Orion Money Purchase Provident Fund (SA) (1) 2004 2 BPLR 5443 (PFA). 
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was being maladministered by its board, which had failed to timeously 
collect the contributions due to the fund. In deciding this dispute Murphy 
looked at the provisions of the Pension Funds Act, section 7 in particular, 
and correctly held: 
The board of management of any pension fund organisation has several 
obligations imposed on itself (by law) to ensure that the interests of the fund, 
which includes the interests of the members are protected at all times. Several 
of these duties, which formed part of the common law, have now been codified 
and appear in the Act.39 
And,  
As stated, in terms of section 7C(2), the board must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the interests of members in terms of the rules of the fund and the 
provisions of the Act are protected at all times. Furthermore, it is specifically 
stipulated in section 7D(1)(d) that the board must take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that contributions are paid timeously to the fund.40 
Simply put, it can be argued that as far back as in 2001 the office of the 
PFA was already giving effect to the provisions of the Pension Funds Act 
by placing the duty to collect fund contributions on the fund, irrespective of 
what the rules provided for. This was also made clear in Welch v Golden 
Pension Fund, where Murphy authoritatively held that the employer's 
failure to make fund contributions did not affect the employee's withdrawal 
benefit claim.41 On this occasion he held: 
At the very best, the failure to pay contributions on the part of the employer may 
entitle the fund to bring a claim against the employer for the recovery of arrear 
contributions as well as damages suffered by it due to the employer's breach of 
the contribution rules. Thus, the fund's liability to the [employee member] 
remains unaltered and there is no rule or legislative provision allowing the fund 
to escape such liability by virtue of receiving no contributions.42 
There is value in placing the duty to collect fund contributions squarely on 
the shoulders of the fund. Where fund contributions had not been received 
and the fund has suffered damages in having to pay withdrawal benefits 
where no contributions had been received, the fund is comparatively better 
placed to engage in expensive protracted litigation against the employer 
for the recovery of arrear contributions as suggested by Murphy. 
Unfortunately these clear benefits enunciated by Murphy were halted by 
the High Court in Orion Money Purchase.  
                                            
39  Emma v Orion Money Purchase Provident Fund (SA) (1) 2004 2 BPLR 5443 (PFA) 
para 14. 
40  Emma v Orion Money Purchase Provident Fund (SA) (1) 2004 2 BPLR 5443 (PFA) 
para 15. 
41  Welch v Golden Pension Fund 2002 1 BPLR 3007 (PFA). 
42  Welch v Golden Pension Fund 2002 1 BPLR 3007 (PFA) para 14. 
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Orion Money Purchase seems to be at odds with various sections of the 
Pension Funds Act read holistically; not least with section 13A(1)(a). This 
section is instructive in providing that the employer of any member of a 
registered fund shall pay the following in full to the fund 
(a) any contribution which, in terms of the rules of the fund, is to be deducted 
from the member's remuneration; and 
(b) any contribution for which the employer is liable in terms of those rules. 
The provisions of this section are clear and no meaning other than its 
literal grammatical meaning could be employed to ascertain what is meant 
by the provision.43 Section 13A(3)(a)(i) goes a step further in providing that 
such contributions must be paid directly into the account of the fund. In 
section 13A(3)(a)(ii) the Pension Funds Act states that the contributions 
must be paid directly to the fund in such a manner as to have the fund 
receive the contribution by no later than seven days after the end of the 
month in which such a contribution is due and payable. The provisions of 
section 13A should be read together with regulation 33 in its entirety.  
Section 13A is supported by sections 7C and 7D of the Act. Section 7C 
lists the objects of the board of a fund and states amongst its objects the 
board will direct, control and oversee the operations of the fund in 
accordance with the applicable laws and the rules of the fund.44 Section 
7C(2) goes on to state that the board is required to take all reasonable 
steps to ensure that the interests of members are protected. Part of 
ensuring that the interests of the members are protected involves the 
board's adopting a proactive attitude towards the workings of the fund. 
Section 7D sets out the duties of the board. Section 7D(d) literally provides 
that the board has a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that fund 
contributions are paid timeously and in accordance with the Pension 
Funds Act.45 A board that does not take proactive steps to ensure that 
fund contributions are received by the fund has in fact neglected to 
perform its duties under sections 7C and 7D.46 
A proper reading of sections 7C and 7D read with section 13A and 
regulation 33 shows that the Pension Funds Act places a positive duty on 
                                            
43  It remains a principle of our law that words must be afforded their literal grammatical 
meaning (see amongst others Randburg Town Council v Kerksay Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 1998 1 SA 98 (SCA) 107; Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni 
Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) para 18). 
44  See s 7C(1) of the Pension Funds Act. 
45  See Martin v The Printing Industry Pension Fund for SATU Members 2003 4 BPLR 
4562 (PFA). 
46  Emma v Orion Money Purchase Provident Fund (SA) (1) 2004 2 BPLR 5443 (PFA) 
para 21. 
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the board of management of the fund to collect the contributions due to the 
fund, and sets out steps that an occupational retirement fund would be 
required to take against defaulting and non-complying employers. If an 
occupational retirement fund eschews its clearly stated and demarcated 
obligations under the Pension Funds Act and loss to the employee 
member follows, as is often the case where fund contributions have not 
been collected, it is only fair and just that the fund be held liable. This is 
what the office of the PFA did in the determinations. 
Being mindful of the duties placed on the board by the clear provisions of 
the Pension Funds Act, certain boards have taken defaulting and non-
complying employers to court. This shows that Murphy's determinations 
were capable of enforcement. A case in point was Private Sector Security 
Provident Fund v Naphtronics (Pty) Ltd,47 where the board of a fund 
approached a court for an order compelling the employer to pay fund 
contributions to the fund, which order was given. It goes without saying 
that more boards would take steps of this nature if courts and the office of 
the PFA resolved such disputes by placing the liability for unpaid 
contributions firmly at the door of the funds. 
Nel J's finding in Orion Money Purchase is also problematic to the extent 
that there are certain important provisions of the Pension Funds Act that 
get overlooked. One of those provisions is section 16, which requires the 
fund to cause its financial condition to be investigated and reported on by 
a valuator appointed in terms of section 9A(1) at least once in every three 
years. If the intention of the Pension Funds Act was not for the fund to 
collect contributions, this section would be difficult to enforce, because it is 
logical that where fund contributions have not been received, that would 
impact on the fund's financial position, which would in turn make it difficult 
for the fund to have its financial condition investigated. 
Another worrying factor about Nel J's judgment is not only that it set a 
judicial precedent that in cases where employers had failed to make fund 
contributions to the fund, such contributions must be demanded from the 
employer, but that the judgment is oblivious to the fact that there may be 
situations where the employer is unable to pay the accumulated fund 
contributions. This may be as a result of the employer's facing financial 
difficulties or that at that stage the amount due to the employee member 
may be so great that the employer cannot pay. What happens then? The 
                                            
47  Private Sector Security Provident Fund v Naphtronics (Pty) Ltd 2008 29 ILJ 289 (B). 
Also see South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Lukhanji Municipality, 
South African Local Authorities Pension Fund v Tsolwana Municipality 2011 
ZAECGHC 54 (18 October 2011). 
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judgment does not deal with these realities. The benefit of placing the duty 
to collect fund contributions on the board, as the Pension Funds Act 
intended, is that the risks associated with such realities never pass to the 
employee member.  
In addition, it should be recalled that in setting aside Murphy's 
determination Nel J remarked that the deprived employees were entitled to 
claim the loss of their benefits from the employer. This was the alternative 
order sought by the Fund, which was not opposed by the employer.48 The 
remark by Nel J was in direct opposition to the one made by Murphy when 
he held that the fund, after paying the withdrawal benefit, could always 
claim damages from the employer, who had failed to make the fund 
contributions in the first place. Murphy's finding appears to be a perfectly 
sound conclusion. Unfortunately Nel J did not say how and to what extent 
Murphy was incorrect in reaching that conclusion. 
But there is another problem with Nel J's approach, probably the biggest 
one of them all. The approach does not take into account the constitutional 
imperatives involved in matters of this nature. Section 27(1)(c) provides 
that everyone has the right to have access to social security. It is trite that 
occupational retirement funds constitute social security. Linda Jansen Van 
Rensburg and Lucie Lamarche have defined social security as follows: 
Social security as one possible form of social protection refers to contributory 
schemes of social protection, in terms of which benefits for a variety of possible 
contingencies are 'earned' through the payment of contributions. Social security 
schemes can be privately run schemes in terms of which, for instance, private 
employers and employees pay regular contributions to pension or provident 
funds, or private persons buy social insurance covering other unexpected 
events.49 
What is clear from Jansen Van Rensburg and Lamarche's definition is that 
occupational retirement funding can be seen as the type of social security 
referred to in section 27(1)(c) of the Constitution. If this is the case it 
follows that the correct approach to be adopted when faced with 
occupational retirement funds disputes is a cautious one, lest unjustified 
inroads that result in deprivations are made into the constitutionally 
protected rights of employee members of occupational retirement funds. 
The approach articulated in Orion Money Purchase is not cautious of the 
constitutional rights that may be implicated when benefits are denied on 
the strength of fund rules. If it was, there would be some consideration of 
                                            
48  Orion Money Purchase 17. 
49  Jansen van Rensburg and Lamarche "Right to Social Security and Assistance" 210 
(footnotes omitted). 
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the hardships that befall those who claim benefits which are denied on the 
basis of the provisions of the rules. 
Going further, occupational retirement benefits have been characterised 
as a form of remuneration or payment due to an employee. In 
Younghusband v Decca Contractors (SA) Pension Fund and its Trustees50 
it was held that: 
Pension benefits are part and parcel of the costs of employing labour, they 
are part of the remuneration which labour receives for services rendered. 
They form an integral part of the industrial relations bargain. Hence, it is 
inappropriate to view them as a form of employer benevolence.51 
This proposition was accepted by the High Court in Resa Pension Fund v 
Pension Funds Adjudicator,52 where the court accepted that: 
[P]ension rights amount to deferred pay, rather than gratuities bestowed 
within the benevolence of the employer, and that members are entitled to 
have their investment value preserved where their employment relationship 
is modified as a consequence of a corporate restructuring over which they 
have no control.53 
If it is accepted that an occupational retirement benefit constitutes 
remuneration due to an employee, then it follows that any failure by an 
employer to make contributions to the fund constitutes non-payment of 
that employee's remuneration and also limits that employees earning 
capacity. Any indiscriminate reliance on the rules of the retirement fund 
may cause a member to forfeit this remuneration where a claim is rejected 
merely because a particular employer has failed to make contributions to 
the fund.  
Our Constitutional Court has assumed without deciding that an individual's 
earning capacity is protected as property under section 25 of the 
Constitution. This is so because "[s]ection 25(4)(b) makes it clear that 
property is not limited to land. It must follow that both corporeal and 
incorporeal property enjoy protection".54 If we accept that a retirement 
benefit is property under the property clause, then we should accept that 
members are not to be deprived of their benefits lightly. The way in which 
Orion Money Purchase is implemented is to the effect that claimants can 
                                            
50  Younghusband v Decca Contractors (SA) Pension Fund and its Trustees 1999 20 
ILJ 1640 (PFA). 
51  Younghusband v Decca Contractors (SA) Pension Fund and its Trustees 1999 20 
ILJ 1640 (PFA) 1658A. 
52  Resa Pension Fund v Pension Funds Adjudicator 2000 3 SA 313 (C). 
53  Resa Pension Fund v Pension Funds Adjudicator 2000 3 SA 313 (C) para 15. 
54  Law Society of South African v Minister for Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) paras 83-
84. 
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possibly without more have their claims rejected, and thereby be deprived 
of their vested property rights just because the rules say so. The point 
being made here is that this over reliance on the rules of the retirement 
fund is dangerous, as it unlawfully deprives members of their vested 
benefits. 
Accordingly, it would appear that those who are engaged in occupational 
retirement funds disputes need not only approach their tasks cautiously 
but need to do so with circumspection, keeping in mind that their decisions 
may amount to an infringement of the parties' rights to access to social 
security, remuneration and property. 
It is this paper's argument that for all the reasons already advanced, this 
current approach to the resolution of occupational retirement disputes may 
easily lead to the infringement of people's constitutional rights. More effort 
needs to be put into applying the provisions of the Pension Funds Act for 
"[t]he Act read together with the regulations and the rules defines the limits 
of the Fund's contractual capacity".55 
It is submitted that there is another reason why the Pension Funds Act 
should be implemented with some vigour when resolving retirement fund 
disputes. That reason has to do with the fact that often employee 
members have no say or contribution in the drafting or the eventual 
acceptance of the rules by the registrar of pension funds. In many other 
instances they do not even know that the rules exist. In simple terms, the 
rules are almost always completely in the domain and province of the 
employer and the fund, to the exclusion of the employee member. The 
only time most employee members hear of the existence of the rules is 
when lodging a claim for a benefit and are told, as were Ms Sekele and Mr 
Gafane, that the fund in terms of its rules cannot pay. As a protective and 
fairness measure for most members who are vulnerable and require 
protection, the Pension Funds Act must assume its rightful position, as 
Murphy employed it, to give protection to employee members.  
Notwithstanding all that has been said about the deficiencies of Nel J's 
judgment, if we accept that occupational retirement funds exist to provide 
pension benefits to their members, is that purpose not negated when 
members are channelled to the employer to claim those benefits, just 
because the fund was not proactive in ensuring that it collects the 
contributions from the employer so as to ensure that it is in a position to 
discharge its duty when called to do so by the employee member?  
                                            
55  ABSA Bank Ltd v SACCAWU National Provident Fund (Under Curatorship) 2012 3 
SA 585 (SCA) para 27. 
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This said, a glimpse of the provisions of the General Amendment Act 
clearly shows that Orion Money Purchase is no longer good law, as it has 
been surpassed by this legislative intervention. The notable features of the 
General Amendment Act are that a provision for personal liability has been 
created for directors of companies who have failed to make fund 
contributions.56 Occupational retirement funds have been empowered to 
request participating employers to furnish written details of persons who 
would be personally liable should fund contributions not be made.57 The 
registrar of pension funds is empowered to refer defaulting and non-
complying participants to the enforcement committee of the Financial 
Service Board. 
8 Conclusion 
The existence of retirement funds is a very important vehicle for the 
provision of retirement benefits to members. Government also has a 
vested interest in a proper regulation and administration of retirement 
funds, because where retirement benefits are adequately provided to 
members, the burden on government to provide these benefits through 
social security grants is lessened. It is for this reason, amongst other 
possible reasons, that the legislature enacted the Pension Funds Act to 
properly regulate the private retirement funds industry.  
Unfortunately those who are entrusted with resolving retirement fund 
disputes have in many ways failed to give effect to the Pension Funds Act. 
In so doing they have in fact flouted the statute in favour of the rules. The 
rules are made under the Pension Funds Act, and common sense and 
logic dictates that where disputes arise the rules will be enforced subject 
to the provisions of the Pension Funds Act, because the substance and 
operation of the rules must be consistently tested against the Pension 
Funds Act. However, the opposite approach, which favours the 
implementation of the rules regardless of the legislation, is currently in 
operation. This approach has had disastrous consequences for employee 
members who have been denied their benefits by retirement funds and 
were instead channelled elsewhere to seek those benefits. 
It is this paper's overall argument that the Pension Funds Act never 
intended for occupational retirement funds to sit back and allow employers 
to manipulate the rules. The Amendment Act, in introducing personal 
liability, tries to insulate employee members from losing out on benefits. It 
                                            
56  Section 13A(8) of General Amendment Act. 
57  Section 13A(9)(a) of General Amendment Act.  
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is rather disappointing that the funds and the office of the PFA are yet to 
apply the provisions of the Amendment Act so as to flush out those 
employers who try to manipulate fund rules in order to be able to deprive 
employee members of fund benefits. It is therefore this paper's conclusion 
that occupational retirement funds must be administered subject to the 
Constitution as the supreme law relating to the rights that are affected and 
the Pension Funds Act. No retirement fund may lawfully adopt and enforce 
conduct that undermines the fundamental rights of beneficiaries. 
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